Ephraim Inbar, Dir. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University
"The United States seems intent on gaining the goodwill of the Arab states so as to sustain an international coalition against the terrorist concern headed by Osama bin Laden. This is a misguided effort.
"The US, the hegemonic power in the world, does not need a coalition. The Americans seem to forget that the test of great powers is more often than not unilateral action. If the US decides to act as a great power – mustering considerable military muscle and projecting it onto any place on the globe – many states will cooperate with Washington. Coalition-building will only impose constraints on its freedom of action. Moreover, the legitimate campaign against terror does not need the approval of notorious anti- American actors or entities that have engaged in terror. Their inclusion is morally repugnant. In the absence of clear repentance on their part, the should not be courted, but isolated.
"Moreover, the US is incapable of endearing itself to the Arab masses. The mere existence of a prosperous and democratic US, leader of the Western world, is a painful reminder to the proud Arab~ (the most advanced culture in the Middle Ages) that their societies have been in a state of stagnation for several centuries. The West is hated because it is successful, while the Arabs have failed miserably to meet the challenges of modernization, globalization, and democratization. Envy and frustration generate hatred and conspiracy theories.
"The easy way out is to blame the West, colonialism, or Zionism for all the illnesses of Arab societies. Indeed, burning American flags has become the standard expression of protest in the streets of Cairo, Damascus, Ramallah, and of course Baghdad.
"Generally, in the Middle East, goodwill is not I the best political currency. Being feared, rather than liked, usually brings better results. The remarkable American demonstration of determination and military might in 19911ed to the apex of American influence in the region. When America failed to win that war against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, many Arab countries gravitated away from Washington, showing growing sympathy for Iraq. They simply feared its ruthless leader more than the Clinton administration.
"In most cases, the US does not need any Arab support to implement its foreign policy preferences. Gradually, the politically and economically decaying Arab world has become less important in world politics. Even the oil- still a strategic commodity -that several Arab countries export is more often than not subject to market forces rather than to political maneuver. This trend in global political economy that start- ed in the 1980s has further marginalized Arab political power. Unfortunately, not all the career officers in the State Department and the Western foreign policy ministries have internalized the significance of the changes in the world oil market. Many of them also suffer from serious misperceptions about what animates the international politics of a region in which they claim expertise…
"One component of the recent American , attempt to placate the Arabs is particularly misguided – the support for a Palestinian state… Although the Arab states paid lip service to the idea, they never moved a finger to further it when the Palestinians were under their rule. They understood that the Palestinian national- movement with its radical offshoots is bad news.
"It is incredible, however, to see Americans with good conservative instincts lend support to the birth of a Palestinian state that will clearly be anti-American and will try to destabilize two American allies -Israel and Jordan. It is highly unlikely that a full-fledged Palestinian entity will desist from turning a blind eye to terrorist acts by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Does America need another Syria or Iraq in the Middle East? This is what Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat is capable of begetting…" (Ephraim Inbar, "Misguided US Mideast diplomacy," JP, 2001.10.08, p. 8).